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Abstract-This paper discusses requirements for anonymous
memories, and proposes their implementation approaches with
possible applications. The anonymous memory is a set of 
memory sections assigned to anonymous owners of memory
sections, and enables the owners to maintain their sensitive
information securely without disclosing their identities even to 
the manager of the memory system. Possible industrial
applications include the remote maintenance, in which
maintenance companies maintain machines located at remote
factories without knowing owners of machines.
Anonymous memory sectionsMemory manager
I. INTRODUCTION
An anonymous memory is a set of memory sections that
are owned by anonymous owners. Owners can maintain their
sensitive information securely while concealing their
identities from others including managers of the memory. In
recent business and other activities, not only information
itself but also owners of the information are required not to be
disclosed, and this is true also for activities in industrial
sectors. For example, currently, machine maintenance
companies can know not only operation histories of machines
to be maintained but also names of factories where the
machines are located [8], but the owner of the machines do 
not want maintenance companies to know their names in
order to keep their production secrets confidential from their
competitors. To satisfy these requirements, in the following
sections, the anonymous memory is proposed. Requirements,
possible implementation approaches and applications are also
discussed.
II. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ANONYMOUS MEMORY
Fig. 1 shows the configuration of the anonymous memory.
It consists of multiple memory sections that are assigned to 
individual owners of the sections. All operations on these
sections are executed by the memory manager, e.g. owners
access their memory sections through the manager. The
memory manager consists of registration, access control,
memory access, error detection and accounting parts, and
registers/deregisters owners, authenticates owners to protect
the memory system from being accessed by unauthorized
entities, executes read/write operations on memory sections,
detects illegal memory operations, and charges owners for
their memory uses, respectively. Owners of memory sections
and the memory manager are connected through anonymous
networks to enable owners to access their memory sections 
while concealing their network addresses.
Fig.1 Configuration of the anonymous memory
To store information securely while maintaining anonymity
of owners, the anonymous memory should satisfy the
following requirements.
Anonymous owners: Owners must be able to read/write data
from/to their memory sections without disclosing their
identities. At the same time, it must be ensured that only
authorized entities are allowed to access their memory
sections. Also in order to achieve anonymity of owners that
access their memory sections through networks, owners
must be able to send their messages and receive responses
while concealing their network addresses.
These requirements can be satisfied by currently
available technologies for anonymous authentication and 
communication. However, anonymous memories must
have the following additional features. Namely, different
from other systems, in which users are registered and
deregistered to or from the systems while disclosing their
identities, in the anonymous memory system, memory
section owners must be registered or deregistered to and
from the system anonymously, because fixed memory
sections are assigned to individual owners. When owners
are registered or deregistered while showing their identities,
the memory manager can easily identify linkages between
memory section owners and their owning memory sections
by finding memory sections that are created/discarded just
after/before the registration/deregistration of owners.
Regarding to the anonymous communication, to use
memory sections for general data retrievals, anonymous
networks should maintain their efficiency almost at the 
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same level as that of non-anonymous ones. Although 
various kinds of Mix-nets [1], [6] successfully achieve 
anonymous communications, they are based on asymmetric 
encryption mechanisms, and therefore their communication 
overheads are not small enough compared with that of non-
anonymous networks. The anonymous memory requires 
anonymous networks with much less overheads. 
Secure data maintenance: Various kinds of causes about data 
corruptions exist for memory systems, e.g. the memory 
system may not accomplish operations requested by 
memory users, memory users may intentionally or 
accidentally put invalid data in their memories, malicious 
third parties may corrupt data, etc. To prevent data 
corruptions or to recover from data corruptions when 
preventions are difficult, any memory system must identify 
cause events that lead data corruptions. However, the 
establishment of mechanisms to identify cause events that 
introduce data corruptions in the anonymous memory is 
more difficult than in usual memory systems, because data 
in memory sections are read or written by anonymous 
owners; and mechanisms that resolve disputes about data 
corruptions between the memory manager and owners 
become important.  
Also, the volume of evidences that should be maintained 
by memory section owners for resolving disputes must be 
reduced as much as possible. Because these evidences are 
sensitive, owners cannot keep them in their private 
memories when their volumes are large, i.e. owners should 
maintain these evidences in other secure memory systems 
managed by other entities. However, maintaining data in 
various different systems is inconvenient and also error 
prone for memory section owners.  
Anonymous payment:  The memory manager should be able 
to charge owners fees for their uses of memory sections at 
the end or the beginning of its every service period, 
without knowing their identities. At the same time memory 
section owners must be able to protect themselves from the 
memory manager’s charges of excessive fees. 
III. POSSIBLE IMPLEMENTATION APPROACHES
A. Anonymous authentication
This subsection proposes anonymous authentication 
mechanisms that satisfy the requirement about anonymous 
owners discussed in the previous section, except the ones 
about anonymous registration and deregistration of owners. 
Mechanisms that enable anonymous registration and 
deregistration are discussed in Sec.3.D. 
The authentication mechanisms in anonymous memory 
systems must satisfy the following requirements, i.e.  
1) Identities of memory section owners that are accessing 
their memory sections must not be disclosed to any entity 
except the owners themselves, and 
2) The memory manager must accept requests for accessing 
particular memory sections only from owners of the 
corresponding memory sections. 
Anonymous tokens based on blind signature [4][7] and 
several additional mechanisms proposed here satisfy the 
above requirements. A mechanism for anonymous tokens 
works as follows. Namely, the memory manager M
authenticates memory section owner O only when O shows a 
token that has M’s signature and it is not used repeatedly. 
Here, each token consists of a unique number, and M issues a 
new token to O for its next authentication request while 
blindly signing on it, in exchange for the token that O is 
currently using. Then, because only authorized owners have 
tokens with M’s signature, and M signs on tokens without 
knowing their contents, O can prove its eligibility without 
disclosing its identity. 
 In more detail, O chooses a number Tn that is unique in the 
system before its (n-1)-th authentication request, and encrypts 
Tn into EO(Tn) by its secret encryption key KO.  Then, M signs 
on EO(Tn) by its secret key KM to generate SM(EO(Tn)). Here, 
the result SM(EO(Tn)) is M’s blind signature on Tn. Namely, O
can generate a token SM(Tn) while decrypting SM(EO(Tn)) by 
its secret decryption key KO
-1; and anyone can reconstruct Tn
from SM(Tn) by using KM
-1, the public key of M. However, M
cannot identify O from SM(Tn), because M signs on EO(Tn)
without knowing Tn.
It is trivial to link individual memory sections to their 
anonymous owners. Manager M can identify the linkage 
between a memory section and its owner O by only 
memorizing blinded token EO(Tn) that O showed to M at its 
previous ((n-1)-th) authentication request. Namely, M can 
decide that O has the right to access its requesting memory 
section when O’s showing token SM(Tn) is consistent with 
blinded token EO(Tn) corresponded to the memory section. 
Additive encryption algorithms described in subsection 3-C 
enables M to determine whether SM(Tn), O’s showing token, 
is consistent with blinded token EO(Tn) that is corresponded to 
the memory section, without knowing O’s secret key. 
For the purpose to conceal only the identity of owner O, O
can ask M to sign on Tn without encrypting it, if O had 
acquired initial signed token SM(T1) anonymously. However 
if Tn is not blinded, M can know the exact memory section 
corresponding to Tn, M can also generate copies of SM(Tn) by 
itself, and unnecessary disputes about impersonation will 
occur, e.g. O can complain that M issues its token SM(Tn) also 
to P while giving a copy of SM(Tn) to P. Therefore O should 
show its unique number Tn while encrypting it into EO(Tn). 
Here, O can generate number Tn that is unique in the system 
by picking it from the unique number-list prepared by M. Of 
course O should pick numbers anonymously through the 
anonymous authentication mechanism, for an example, 
through a mechanism proposed in [9], and to force O to pick 
numbers only from the unique number-list, M must signs on 
numbers in the list while using a secret key different from KM.
Regarding to impersonation, M knows numbers that 
owners picked from the unique number-list; therefore M can 
still generate copies of valid tokens and give them to other 
entities. Although impersonations themselves caused by these 
copies are not serious, because M does not know 
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correspondences between these copies and their
corresponding memory sections, however owners can claim
that M maliciously disclose their tokens while intentionally
disclosing their tokens to others. Disputes of this kind also
can be resolved completely by implicit transaction links
discussed in Sec.3.C. Namely, the manager and owners can
agree about the ownerships of tokens by checking the latest
memory access logs of owners while maintaining anonymity 
of owners.
The 1st requirement relates to situations where intentionally
or accidentally the manager does not accept requests of
memory section owners although the owners are showing
effective tokens, or where the manager does not accomplish
requested operations correctly while accepting requests from
owners. The 2nd requirement relates to cases where memory
section owners claim that the manager does not handle their
requests without sending the requests, or claim that the
manager executes operations that they do not request. About
the 3rd requirement, anonymous memories are for reducing
responsibilities of memory section owners for maintaining
their sensitive data. Then because these evidences are also
sensitive, the volume of evidences that owners should
maintain to resolve disputes must be small enough to make
anonymous memories practical.
B. Anonymous network
Among of various kinds of mechanisms that enable entities
to send messages without disclosing their identities, Mix-net
[1],[6] is the most known and effective mechanism. However, 
conventional mix-nets must adopt asymmetric encryption
algorithms; therefore although they are appropriate for
applications with short message exchanges such as ones in
electric voting, it is difficult to use them for general
applications with heavy message traffics because of their
large overheads in message encryptions and decryptions. The
anonymous memory requires more efficient networks.
These 3 requirements can be satisfied by implicit
transaction links proposed in [10]. An implicit transaction
link used in an anonymous credit card system is a pair of
transaction IDs that are corresponded to the current and the
next transactions of a cardholder as shown in Fig. 2. Here,
transaction IDs in the anonymous credit card system have the
same roles as tokens in the anonymous memory. Therefore in
the figure, the word “token” is used instead of the word
“transaction ID.” An important thing is that the next tokens
are encrypted by cardholders; therefore the card company
cannot know linkages of transactions executed by the same
cardholders, although the card company itself generates and
stores implicit transaction links. The proposed mechanism
exploits this implicit transaction link, i.e. the proposed
mechanism records the log of the n-th request of memory
section owner O with the implicit transaction link. Here,
blinded next token EO(Tn+1) in the implicit transaction link
has a different form from EO(Tn+1), the next token that O
shows to M with its current request to be signed blindly in the
anonymous authentication procedure. Different from EO(),
EO() satisfies the additive property, i.e. the relation EO(A+B)
= EO(A) + EO(B) is satisfied.
This difficulty can be removed by a symmetric encryption
based Mix-net (SEBM) proposed in [11].  Different from
usual Mix-nets, SEMB adopts symmetric encryption
algorithms to conceal identities of message senders, i.e.
encryptions and decryptions of data are achieved by simple
secret number multiplications. Therefore entities can send
large amount of data with much less overheads than in usual
Mix-nets. Also, although the massage encryption mechanism
is simple, it is hard to break it, because different secret
numbers are applied to different messages.
C. Dispute resolution
Mechanisms proposed in this subsection relate to the
requirements about secure data maintenance and a part of 
anonymous owners discussed in the previous section.
Because the memory manager executes all operations on 
memory sections requested by memory section owners,
disputes about data corruptions can be resolved easily after 
the manager’s acceptance of memory read/write operation
requests. Namely, the manager is responsible for any data
corruptions once the manager and the owner mutually agree
with that the owner’s requesting operation is accepted by the
manager. Therefore, when the following 3 mechanisms are
established, disputes between the manager and memory
section owners about data corruptions can be resolved while
making the anonymous memory system practical.
Current token
Tn
Blinded next token
EO(Tn+1)
Fig. 2 Implicit transaction link 
A log of the n-th request of memory section owner O is 
constituted as a set of items shown in Fig.3, i.e. RN(n), ITL(n),
REQ(n) and r(n). In the figure, RN(n) is the number of 
requests that O asked to execute until now (i.e. RN(n) = n),
ITL(n) and REQ(n) represent the implicit transaction link and
the request digest (REQ(n) is calculated as EO(H(requested
operation)); where H() is a hash function), and r(n) is a 
random number secret from owners. Then different from M
that should maintain logs of all requests, O maintains only its
latest accumulated log ACC(n). ACC(n) is a set of ARN(n),
AITL(n), AREQ(n), and Ar(n), and they are calculated as 
{RN(1) + --- + RN(n)}, {ITL(1) + --- + ITL(n)}, {REQ(1) + --
- + REQ(n)}, and {r(1) + --- + r(n)}, respectively. Actually, a
log is encrypted to a set of linear combinations of 4 items in
1) To force the memory manager to accomplish operations
requested by memory section owners when the owners
show their effective tokens,
2) To force memory section owners to approve completions
of their requesting operations when the manager
accomplishes the operations successfully, and
3) To reduce the volume of evidences that memory section
owners should maintain to resolve disputes about data
corruptions as much as possible.
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Fig.3 by applying M’s secret coefficients. Therefore O cannot
forge nor modify its logs consistently. On the other hand, M
that knows the coefficients can calculate ARN(n), AITL(n),
AREQ(n), and Ar(n) from the sum of encrypted logs by
solving linear equations. At the same time, M cannot modify
logs consistently either, because ITL(n) and REQ(n) are 
constructed by O’s secret key.
Fig. 3 Request log
Hand shaking procedure between M and O: M and O
mutually agree with the M’s acceptance of O’s n-th request
through the following steps, i.e., 
1) O requests operations on its memory section S while
showing its n-th token SM(Tn), its accumulated log
ACC(n-1) and the location of S,
2) M checks Tn, i.e. checks whether Tn has M’s signature,
it is not used repeatedly, and it is consistent with 
EO(Tn). Here EO(Tn) is the next token in the implicit
transaction link of the latest log about S,
3) When Tn passes the above checks, M accepts the
request, and it executes requested operations,
4) When O confirms that its request has been
accomplished, it calculates ITL(n) and REQ(n), and
sends them with blinded token EO(Tn+1) to M.
5) M calculates the log, signs on EO(Tn+1) as SM(EO(Tn+1))
and returns the results to O.
6) O calculates accumulated log ACC(n) and  decrypts
SM(EO(Tn+1)) into SM(Tn+1).
In the 2nd step, M can determine whether Tn is consistent
with EO(Tn) without knowing the secret key of O. Because 
EO() is additive, when M asks O to decrypt EO(t) = e1EO(t1) +
e2EO(t2) + --- + esEO(ts) + es+1EO(Tn) into t = e1t1 + e2t2 + --- +
ests + es+1Tn by O’s secret key, O can calculate correct t even 
it does not know e1, e2, --- ,es+1, if Tn and EO(Tn) are consistent.
On the other hand, it cannot calculate t without knowing the
random numbers e1, e2, --- , es+1, when Tn is not consistent
with EO(Tn). Therefore, M can determine that Tn is consistent
with EO(Tn) when O returns t correctly. Here, e1. e2, --- ,es+1
are random numbers secret from O, and t1, t2, ---, ts are test
tokens, and O encrypts t1, t2, ---, ts into EO(t1), EO(t2), ---
EO(ts) by its secret key and sends the results to M, when O
registers itself to the anonymous memory system. M can
check the correctness of ITL(n) and REQ(n) sent from O in
the same way. 
Dispute resolution procedure; Disputes between M and O
about data corruptions can be resolved as follows. Firstly,
requests of O are ensured to be accomplished provided that O
has effective token Tn. When the manager M does not accept
O’s request or M executes operations not appropriately, O can 
request operations again or claim that executed operations are
not the requesting ones, while showing Tn, because the latest 
accumulated request log ACC(n-1) enables O to prove that Tn
is owned by O even after Tn and EO(Tn) have been disclosed
to M. Namely, when O calculates the sum of current tokens
and that of the blinded next tokens based on AITL(n-1), the
difference between (Tk - T1) and decrypted EO(Tk+1)
coincides with Tn. Here, T1 is the token that O used in its first
access, and the correctness of O’s decryption can be proved
in the same way as proving correctness of Tn in the 2nd step.
O also can prove that ACC(n-1) is its latest accumulated log,
because no one except O can comstruct ACC(m) (precisely
ITL(m) and REQ(m)) for nm that can be decrypted into
meaningful data by O’s secret key. Here, when M insists that 
its forging ACC(m) is O’s latest log, O should disclose its
secret key in order to prove that ACC(m) is invalid. However
M must accept the risk that it cannot continue its services 
when it is determined that ACC(m) is invalid. It is trivial to
ensure the accomplishment of O’s n-th request after O has got
its n-th request log from M.
RN(n) r(n)
ITL(n)
Implicit transaction link
REQ(n)
Request digest
On the other hand, M can prove that O has approved the
accomplishment of its n-th request by showing Tn+1, token
that O used for its (n+1)-th request, because O can get Tn+1
only after confirming the completion of its n-th request. Also
O should agree with the fact that Tn+1 belongs to O, when M
reveals its maintaining ITL(n). In the case when O does not
return blinded token EO(Tn+1) to M, the transaction of O does
not terminate and M cannot continue interactions with O;
however this does not cause any inconvenience. All entities
except O can continue to access the memory system
successfully.
About the 3rd requirement, as discussed in the above,
evidences that should be maintained by individual memory
section owners to prove their honesties and to ensure
completions of their requesting operations are only their latest
tokens and accumulated request logs.
The above mechanism does not prevent M’s dishonesty, in
which M writes corrupted data in memory sections while
returning consistent evidences to owners. However, these
kinds of dishonesties will be eventually detected by owners 
when they read their memory sections, and disputes about the 
causes of the data corruptions are resolved by using
accumulated request logs maintained by the owners as
described above. A tamper resistant memory discussed in the
next section can provide more efficient solutions.
D. Anonymous registration and payment
It is straightforward to apply anonymous credit card
systems proposed in [10] to anonymous payment for using of
memory sections. However, owners should pay for memory
uses in individual operation periods before the periods start.
Because owners are anonymous, the memory manager cannot
identify owners that did not pay for their memory uses
without complicated procedures. If payments are done before
individual operation periods, even when an owner does not
pay for its memory section, the memory manager can simply
close the corresponding memory section. 
Regarding to owner registration and deregistration,
memory section owners can access their memories without 
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disclosing their identities after they acquire their initial tokens, 
even if they are registered while disclosing their identities. 
However, when owner O creates/discards its memory section 
immediately after it has been registered/deregistered, it is not 
difficult for manager M to link O and its memory section. 
Therefore O should register and deregister itself without 
disclosing its identity, while proving its eligibility.  
This anonymous registration and deregistration can be 
achieved by anonymous credit card systems. Namely, the 
credit card system checks the eligibility for memory section 
owners when it checks that for cardholders at its card 
registration phases while identifying owners; and owners 
register themselves to the memory system as transactions of 
the credit card system to acquire their initial tokens for 
memory sections. Then, owners can protect them from being 
linked to their memory sections, because transactions of 
credit card systems are anonymous. Deregistration can be 
executed simply based on anonymous tokens that owners 
acquired at their last memory accesses. 
However, credit card systems must not be linked to 
anonymous memory systems except in conjunction with 
registrations and payments. The reason is as follows. Namely, 
in anonymous memory systems, sequences of requests of the 
same memory section owners necessarily linked, because 
owners access their same memory sections. However, 
sequences of transactions of same cardholders must be 
protected from being linked, because these sequences are 
strong supports to identify cardholders. Therefore, tokens for 
using credit card systems and those for accessing memory 
sections must be issued as independent ones. When memory 
section owners use tokens of credit card systems only for 
registrations and payments, entities other than owners, e.g. 
the memory manager, can link tokens of credit card systems 
to those of memory systems only once a month for example. 
Therefore it is impossible to estimate cardholders through 
these linkages.  
IV. USING ANONYMOUS MEMORY SYSTEMS
Memory section owners of the proposed anonymous 
memory must execute the following steps to acquire and use 
their memory sections. 
1) Proving eligibility 
Memory section owner O registers itself to the 
anonymous credit card system, while showing its 
identity, then O is automatically accepted as an 
eligible entity for the memory system.  
2) Registration 
O registers itself to the memory system without 
disclosing its identity by showing its current 
transaction ID (a token for the credit card system). 
Then the memory system manager M assigns memory 
sections to O, and O acquires its initial token (M
registers the linkage between the encrypted initial 
token and the memory sections to identify the memory 
sections owned by O). 
3) Accessing memory sections 
O executes operations on its memory sections while 
showing its current token, and acquires its next token. 
4) Payment 
O pays for its memory section through the credit card 
system while showing its transaction ID and current 
token at the beginning of every service period of the 
memory system. As the consequence O acquires its 
next token. 
5) Deregistration 
O deregisters itself from the memory system while 
showing its current token. 
V. APPLICATIONS OF THE ANONYMOUS MEMORY
The anonymous memory has various applications, e.g. 
people can save their transaction records of anonymous credit 
card systems anonymously, so that they can recover the data 
even when they lose their cards. In this section, 2 possible 
industrial applications are discussed, the one is the remote 
maintenance and the other is the tamper resistant memory.  
A. Remote maintenance 
Fig.4 shows an example of the configuration of the 
anonymous memory for remote maintenance. Owners of 
machines put operation states of their machines in their 
anonymous memory sections, and maintenance companies 
maintain machines by the data stored in the memory sections 
without knowing the machine owners. There are at least 2 
advantages to use the anonymous memory, i.e. not to connect 
machines and maintenance companies directly through 
anonymous networks. Firstly, the volume of messages put 
into anonymous communication channels can be distributed 
over time. In cases where machines and maintenance 
companies are connected directly through anonymous 
networks, the volume of messages increases as maintenance 
companies start their maintenance jobs. On the other hand 
when anonymous memories are used, machines can send their 
state information to their corresponding anonymous memory 
sections through anonymous networks that are not efficient as 
non-anonymous ones bit by bit, not as batch data. Secondary 
maintenance data of multiple machines can be efficiently 
distributed and merged so that they are seen as different 
virtual machines to protect owners of machines from being 
identified through histories of their states as discussed below. 
A serious problem of remote maintenance systems 
discussed here is the fact that in many cases operation 
histories of machines located at a factory provide good 
suggestions to estimate the factory. Maintenance companies 
may estimate machine owners when the owners provide the 
maintenance companies with complete histories of operation 
states of their machines. Theoretically, there are methods to 
calculate any kind of statistics from encrypted data [2][3][5], 
i.e. without disclosing exact raw data, however they are not 
practical, because they require a lot of computations and 
communications. Therefore this subsection discusses the 
other 2 possibilities although they are strongly problem 
dependent.  In the figure, memory sections are divided into 2
levels, i.e. level-1, in which raw operation data of machines 
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are stored, and level-2, from which maintenance companies
acquire data necessary for maintenances. Here, selected data
in the level-1 memory sections are transferred to the level-2
memory sections, so that memory sections in the level-2
constitute virtual machine groups consists of combinations of
multiple machines located at different places (sometimes
owned by different owners). Therefore it becomes difficult
for maintenance companies to identify real owners of
machines from operation histories of virtual machine groups
they are maintaining. Another solution is to exploit
homomorphic encryption algorithms. Here, homomorphic
encryption function E() satisfies E(A) + E(B) = E(A+B),
E(A)E(B) = E(AB), or E(A)E(B)= E(A+B). Therefore, when 
machine owners encrypt operation histories of their machines
based on these encryption algorithms to be put in the
anonymous memory sections, it is possible to divide
maintenance functions into modules, and distribute these
modules to maintenance companies and machine owners, so
that the maintenance companies calculate averages, variances,
auto/mutual correlations, etc. of encrypted operation histories,
and the machine owners decrypt them to send the results back
to the maintenance companies.
Fig.4 Remote maintenance
B. Tamper resistant memory
A tamper resistant memory section is a memory section 
that can protect the data in it from being modified by
unauthorized entities. One form of a tamper resistant memory
section is a duplicated one, i.e. a memory section that has
multiple copies. Data owners can check correctness of their
data by comparing multiple copies; they can detect illegal
data modifications when data in multiple copies are not
consistent, and they can recover the modified data along the
majority decision principle.
A proposed tamper resistant memory based on the
anonymous memory shown in Fig. 5 enhances the security of
these duplicated memory sections. Namely, different from
normal duplicated memory sections, in which entities, e.g.
system managers, can illegally modify data without being
detected by modifying data in all copies, data in anonymous
memory based duplicated memory sections are difficult to 
modify, because unauthorized entities that try to modify the 
data do not know locations of the copies.
To make the tamper resistant memory more secure,
asynchronous and fake memory access mechanisms must be
implemented, because entities can identify locations of 
anonymous copies by eavesdropping simultaneous memory
access messages. Also the data in different copies must be 
encrypted by different keys, in order to disable eavesdroppers
to identify locations of anonymous copies by comparing their 
contents.
Anonymous
memory section
Anonymous
memory section
Anonymous
network
Memory section
owner
Anonymous
memory section
Fig. 5 Tamper resistant memory
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper discusses requirements for the anonymous
memory. Approaches to satisfying the requirements and 2
industrial applications, i.e. remote maintenance and tamper
resistant memories are also discussed. Although it is not
discussed, SAAS (Software As A Service) is one of the
possible important applications.
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